UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

IN RE:

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
TERRORISM LITIGATION
 Civil Action Nos.

 01-CV-2094, 01-CV-2684, 02-CV-1811,
 03-CV-1486, 03-CV-1708, 03-CV-1959,
 05-CV-2124, 06-CV-473, 06-CV-516,
 06-CV-596, 06-CV-690, 06-CV-750,

 06-CV-1116, 07-CV-1302, 08-CV-520,

)08-CV-531, 08-CV-1273, 08-CV-1615,
 08 CV-1807, 08-CV-1814
I.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Table of Contents................................................................................................................ 1
II. Introduction........................................................................................................................ 3
III. Discussion.......................................................................................................................... 9
A. Historical Overview of the FISA State Sponsor of Terrorism Exception as it
Relates to Actions Against the Islamic Republic of Iran...................................... 13
1. The Original State Sponsor of Terrorism Exception to Foreign
Sovereign Immunity, Section 1605(a)(7) and the Flatow Amendment,
Section 1605 Note, and Litigation Against Iran for its Provision of
Material Support to Terrorist Organizations............................................. 14
2. Setbacks for Plaintiffs: The D.C. Circuit’s Decision in Cicippio-Puleo. . 22
3. The Never-Ending Struggle to Enforce Judgments Against Iran. ............ 27
B. Section 1083 of the 2008 NDAA and the Creation of a Terrorism Exception,
Section 1605A....................................................................................................... 44
1. New Federal Cause of Action. .................................................................. 44

2. Punitive Damages. ....................................................................................48
3. Compensation for Special Masters. .......................................................... 49
4. More Robust Provisions for the Execution of Civil Judgments. .............. 49
C. Retroactive Application of Section 1605A to Cases Previously Filed Under
Section 1605(a)(7). ............................................................................................... 52
1. Section 1083(c)(2) – Prior Actions........................................................... 53
2. Section 1083(c)(3) – Related Actions....................................................... 55
3. The 60-Day Rule – Filing Deadline for Cases Based on Prior Actions
Under Section 1605(a)(7). ........................................................................ 56
4. Section 1083(c)(2)(B) – Defenses Waived: Res Judicata, Collateral
Estoppel, and Statute of Limitations Are Deemed Waived to the Extent
that those Defenses Relate to Claims Litigated in a Prior Action Under
Section 1605(a)(7). ................................................................................... 56
D. Efforts to Obtain Retroactive Treatment Under the New Terrorism Exception,
Section 1605A....................................................................................................... 58
E. Examination of Section 1083(c) of the 2008 NDAA Under Article III of the
United States Constitution. ................................................................................... 62
1. Principles of Law – The Independence of the Federal Judiciary Under
Article III and the Finality of Judgments.................................................. 66
2. Analysis of the Constitutional Question in Light of the Supreme
Court’s Jurisprudence. .............................................................................. 76
a. Does Section 1083(c)(3) Direct the Reopening of Final
Judgments Entered Before its Enactment and Therefore
Contravene Article III as Construed by the Supreme Court in
Plaut? ............................................................................................ 77
b. Assuming that Section 1083(c)(3) Does Not Direct the
Reopening of Final judgments, Does the Waiver of Res
Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effect of any Prior Terrorism
FSIA Action Nonetheless Offend Article III because Congress
has Directed the Courts to Ignore Fundamental and
Longstanding Judicial Doctrines?................................................. 86
3. Additional Considerations. .......................................................................96

F. Analysis of Whether Actions Under Section 1605(a)(7) Have Qualified for
Retroactive Treatment Under Section 1605A..................................................... 102
1. The Belt-and-Suspenders Plaintiffs: Those Who Have Invoked both
Section 1083(c)(2) and (c)(3).................................................................. 104
2. The Related-Action Plaintiffs: Those Who Have Filed New Actions
Pursuant to Section 1083(c)(3). .............................................................. 115
3. The Do-Nothing Plaintiffs: Those Who Have Invoked Neither Section
1083(c)(2) Nor (c)(3) in Their Efforts to Retroactively Claim the New
Entitlements Under Section 1605A. ....................................................... 119
4. General Guidance for All Cases. ............................................................ 125
G. Service of New Claims in Pending Cases........................................................... 126
H Guidance for Plaintiffs Who May Wish to Pursue Relief Under Rule 60 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure........................................................................ 133
I. Compensation for Special Masters. .................................................................... 137
J. Motions for Appointment of Receivers. ............................................................. 143
K. A Call for Meaningful Reform. .......................................................................... 156
L. An Invitation for the United States to Participate in These Actions................... 186
IV. Conclusion. ..................................................................................................................... 187
II.
INTRODUCTION
For more than a decade now, this Court has presided over what has been a twisting and
turning course of litigation against the Islamic Republic of Iran under the state sponsor of
terrorism exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). Despite the best intentions
of Congress and moral statements of support from the Executive Branch, the stark reality is that

the plaintiffs in these actions face continuous road blocks and setbacks in what has been an
increasingly futile exercise to hold Iran accountable for unspeakable acts of terrorist violence.1
The cases against Iran that will be addressed by the Court today involve more than one
thousand individual plaintiffs. Like countless others before them, the plaintiffs in these actions
have demonstrated through competent evidence—including the testimony of several prominent
experts in the field of national security—that Iran has provided material support to terrorist
organizations, like Hezbollah and Hamas, that have orchestrated unconscionable acts of violence
that have killed or injured hundreds of Americans. As a result of these civil actions, Iran faces
more than nine billion dollars in liability in the form of court judgments for money damages.
Despite plaintiffs’ best efforts to execute these court judgments, virtually all have gone
unsatisfied.
This consolidated opinion focuses on recent legislative changes in this extraordinary area
of the law, as implemented by Congress last term in § 1083 of the 2008 National Defense

1 The Islamic Republic of Iran was designated by the Secretary of State as a state sponsor
of terrorism on January 19, 1984. The State Department maintains a list of countries that have
been designated as state sponsors of terrorism on the Department’s website. See U.S. Dep’t of
State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2009).
As noted at the website, countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism are those countries
that the Secretary of State has determined “have repeatedly provided support for acts of
international terrorism.” Id. The Secretary of State makes that determination and designates
state sponsors of terrorism pursuant to three statutory authorities: § 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(j); § 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act, 22
U.S.C. § 2371; and § 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2780(d). Three other
countries are designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism: Cuba, Sudan, and Syria. U.S. Dep’t of
State, supra note 1. In April 2009, the State Department published its annual Country Reports
on Terrorism, reporting that “Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism” in 2008.
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2008, at 182, available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122599.pdf. “Iran’s involvement in the planning
of financial support of terrorist attacks throughout the Middle East, Europe, and Central Asia has
had a direct impact on international efforts to promote peace, threatened economic stability in the
Gulf, and undermined the growth of democracy.” Id.

Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (2008 NDAA). See Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1083, 122
Stat. 3, 338–44. Section 1083 completely repeals the original state sponsor of terrorism
exception—28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)—which was originally enacted in 1996, and enacts in its
place a new exception—28 U.S.C. § 1605A—that is in many ways more favorable to plaintiffs.
This new statute provides, among other reforms, a new federal cause of action against state
sponsors of terrorism and allows for awards of punitive damages in these cases. Even more
significantly, however, the reforms implemented through § 1083 last year add a number of
measures that are intended to help plaintiffs succeed in enforcing court judgments against state
sponsors of terrorism, such as Iran.
The primary purpose of this opinion is to consider whether and to what extent these
recent changes in the law should apply retroactively to a number of civil actions against Iran that
were filed, and, in many instances, litigated to a final judgment prior to the enactment of the
2008 NDAA. In this particular instance, Congress has provided express guidance in § 1083(c)
with respect to how § 1605A may be applied retroactively to reach a host of cases that were filed
under the original terrorism exception, § 1605(a)(7). In considering this retroactivity question,
the Court will address a variety of other legal and procedural issues relating to what may be
another lengthy course of litigation against Iran.
As is often the case in this area of the law that the Supreme Court has called sui generis,
see Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 698 (2004), this Court must sometimes confront novel
legal questions, including constitutional issues of first impression. Today’s decision is no
different. This Court must address whether § 1083(c) impermissibly directs the reopening of
final judgments in violation of Article III of the Constitution. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,
Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 241 (1995). The Court’s attentiveness to this potentially unconstitutional

application of § 1083(c) was heightened significantly by provisions of § 1083(c) that direct
courts to essentially disregard the firmly established judicial doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel with respect to any matters litigated in a prior FSIA terrorism case.
To the extent that § 1083(c) might be construed as directing the reopening of final
judgments entered under the former version of the terrorism exception, § 1605(a)(7), it would
usurp the prerogative of the judiciary to decide cases under Article III and thereby offend the
principle of separation of powers enshrined within our Constitution. In light of this issue’s
significance with respect to ongoing litigation against Iran, this Court addresses the Article III
question in Part E of this opinion. After careful analysis as set forth below, this Court holds that
the statute withstands constitutional scrutiny.
Today, the Court also reaches an even more fundamental conclusion: Civil litigation
against Iran under the FSIA state sponsor of terrorism exception represents a failed policy. After
more than a decade spent presiding over these difficult cases, this Court now sees that these
cases do not achieve justice for victims, are not sustainable, and threaten to undermine the
President’s foreign policy initiatives during a particularly critical time in our Nation’s history.
The truth is that the prospects for recovery upon judgments entered in these cases are extremely
remote. The amount of Iranian assets currently known to exist with the United States is
approximately 45 million dollars, which is infinitesimal in comparison to the 10 billion dollars in
currently outstanding court judgments.2 Beyond the lack of assets available for execution of
judgments, however, these civil actions inevitably must confront deeply entrenched and
2 See OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TERRORIST
ASSETS REPORT 14–15, tbls. 1, 3 (2007) [hereinafter TERRORIST ASSETS REPORT], available at
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/reports/tar2007.pdf.

fundamental understandings of foreign state sovereignty, conflicting multinational treaties and
executive agreements, and the exercise of presidential executive power in an ever-changing and
increasingly complex world of international affairs.
Unfortunately, the enactment of § 1083 of the 2008 NDAA continues and expands the
terrorism exception and its failed policy of civil litigation as the means of redress in these
horrific cases. The availability of new federal claims under § 1605A with punitive damages,
when combined with the broad retroactive reach accorded to this new statute, means that liability
in the form of billions of dollars more in court judgments will continue to mount and mount
quickly.
As a result of these latest reforms, the victims in these cases will now continue in their
long struggle in pursuit of justice through costly and time-consuming civil litigation against Iran.
They will do this at a time in our Nation’s history when the President has taken bold and
unprecedented steps in an attempt to improve relations with that foreign power while pressing
forward on crucial issues, such as the grave threat of nuclear proliferation posed by Iran.
Regrettably, the continuation in § 1083 of the same flawed policy that has failed plaintiffs in
these actions for over a decade may only stoke the flames of unrealistic and unmanageable
expectations in these terrorism victims who so rightly deserve justice, which may in turn serve
only to expose the Administration to an unprecedented burden in its management of United
States foreign policy towards Iran.
In view of these considerations, the Court will respectfully urge the President and
Congress to seek meaningful reforms in this area of law in the form of a viable alternative to
private litigation as the means of redress for the countless deaths and injuries caused by acts of
terrorism. In Part K of the opinion and in the Conclusion, this Court will speak candidly about

the challenges, complexities, and frustrations borne out by these civil actions over the past
decade in an effort to urge our political leaders to act. If the decade-long history of these FSIA
terrorism actions has revealed anything, it is that the Judiciary cannot resolve the intractable
political dilemmas that frustrate these lawsuits; only Congress and the President can. Today, at
the start of a new presidential administration—one that has sought engagement with Iran on a
host of critical issues—it may be time for our political leaders here in Washington to seek a fresh
approach.3
To assist this Court in these matters going forward, the Court will invite the United States
to participate in these actions by filing a brief in response to the many issues addressed in this
opinion. The Court encourages the United States to express its views regarding this litigation,
but, more importantly, the Court hopes the Government might take this opportunity to give due
consideration to whether there might be a more viable system of redress for these tragic and
difficult cases. With the daunting national security challenges that confront the President with
respect to Iran, our political leaders should candidly acknowledge the challenges and pitfalls of
these terrorism lawsuits. The Court fears that if reforms are not achieved in the near future, these
civil suits against Iran may undermine the President’s ability to act at a time when it matters
most.
3 Reaching out to the people of Iran and their leaders, President Obama recently stated: “I
would like to speak clearly to Iran’s leaders: We have serious differences that have grown over
time. My administration is now committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues
before us and to pursuing constructive ties among the United States, Iran, and the international
community.” Videotaped Remarks on the Observance of Nowruz, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC.,
Mar. 20, 2009.

Today’s omnibus opinion consists of twelve parts and is intended to serve a case
management function in light of the significant changes in the law relating to these civil suits
against Iran. Thus, today’s ruling is consistent with this Court’s inherent authority to manage the
docket. See, e.g., In re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., 552 F.3d. 814, 822 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“District
judges must have authority to manage their dockets, especially during massive litigation . . . .”).
A separate order consistent with this opinion will issue this date.
III.
DISCUSSION
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611,
is the sole basis of jurisdiction over foreign states in our courts. E.g., Argentine Republic v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989); Prevatt v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
421 F. Supp. 2d 152, 157–58 (D. D.C. 2006) (Lamberth, J.). Enacted in 1976, the FSIA codifies
a restrictive theory of foreign state sovereign immunity by which states are generally immune
from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States, subject to a few carefully delineated
exceptions. See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488–89 (1983);
Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In the
original FSIA enactment, exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity included cases in which a
foreign state had either expressly or implicitly waived its immunity and cases relating to the
commercial activities of a foreign sovereign within the United States. See Act of Oct. 21, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891; see also §§ 1605(a), 1605A (codification of current FSIA
exceptions); Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488 (discussing key exceptions under the FSIA).
The state sponsor of terrorism exception of the FSIA was first enacted in 1996 as part of
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, which was itself part of the larger Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 221(a)(1)(C), 110 Stat. 1214, 1241
(formerly codified at § 1605(a)(7)). As noted, however, the original exception at § 1605(a)(7)
was repealed last year by the 2008 NDAA, § 1083(b)(1)(A)(iii), and replaced with a new
exception at § 1605A. It is unclear why Congress chose to repeal rather than simply amend the
prior statute. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-477, at 1001 (2007) (Conf. Rep.) (discussing § 1605A but
omitting discussion of why Congress repealed, instead of amended, § 1605(a)(7)). Perhaps
members of Congress wanted to reinforce the significance of their overhaul of the terrorism
exception. Whatever the case may be, it is important at the outset for this Court to offer some
notes of clarification and historical background information in an effort to avoid any confusion in
the ensuing discussion.
The Court’s analysis today must simultaneously consider two separate and distinct
versions of the terrorism exception of the FSIA—the now-repealed version of the terrorism
exception, § 1605(a)(7), and the new version, § 1605A. While the prior version of the exception,
§ 1605(a)(7), and the new version, § 1605A, differ in many fundamental respects, it is important
to keep in mind that the basic grant of subject matter jurisdiction for actions against state
sponsors of terrorism remains unchanged. Thus, it makes little difference whether one refers to
§ 1605(a)(7) or § 1605A when addressing the degree to which foreign sovereign immunity has
been removed, subjecting designated state sponsors of terrorism to lawsuits in our courts.
Indeed, the language eliminating sovereign immunity in the new exception, § 1605A, is virtually
identical to the operative language in § 1605(a)(7). Compare § 1605(a)(7) with § 1605A(a)(1).
Accordingly, in those instances in which the Court is merely referring to the grant of subject
matter jurisdiction afforded by the virtue of the FSIA’s terrorism exception, it will do so broadly,

without any additional effort to underscore the two different statutes, as the two provisions are in
fact indistinguishable in terms of the basic jurisdiction conferring language.
While the grant of subject matter jurisdiction for suits against state sponsors of terrorism
is virtually unchanged, the latest version of the terrorism exception, § 1605A, adds substantive
rights and remedies that were not available previously. As noted above, § 1605A is a much more
expansive provision, one which provides a federal cause of action, as well as many other
statutory entitlements. These new rights and remedies are the central focus of today’s decision.
The issue is whether the plaintiffs in actions that were filed, at least initially, under the nowrepealed
§ 1605(a)(7), can now avail themselves of the additional entitlements associated with
the new exception, § 1605A. Thus, to extent that some of these plaintiffs are unable to claim the
benefits of the new terrorism law retroactively, then the prior exception, § 1605(a)(7)—even
though now repealed—remains viable and indeed is the controlling source of law in their cases.
This is consistent with both the guidance provided by Congress in § 1083(c) of the 2008 NDAA
and the general presumption against the retroactive application of laws. See Landgraf v. USI
Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 286 (1994) (“The presumption against statutory retroactivity is
founded upon sound considerations of general policy and practice, and accords with long held
and widely shared expectations about the usual operation of legislation.”). Thus, when dealing
with the nuts and bolts of the retroactivity analysis, especially in Part D below where the Court
looks individually at each of the 20 cases in this opinion, it is important to keep the two versions
of the exception separate and distinct. As underscored recently by the Court of Appeals for this
Circuit, terrorism cases that were filed prior the enactment of the 2008 NDAA, and which do not
qualify for retroactive treatment under the new exception, are governed by the prior statute,
§ 1605(a)(7). See Simon v. Republic of Iraq, 529 F.3d 1187, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 2008), rev’d on

other grounds sub. nom Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 129 S. Ct. 2183 (2009); accord Oveissi v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 573 F.3d 835 (D.C. Cir. 2009); La Reunion Aerienne v. Socialist
People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 533 F.3d 837, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Owens v. Republic of
Sudan, 531 F.3d 884, 887 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

A.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE FSIA STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM
EXCEPTION AS IT RELATES TO ACTIONS AGAINST
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
The new terrorism exception—§ 1605A—clears away a number of legal obstacles,
including adverse court rulings, that have stifled plaintiffs’ efforts to obtain relief in civil actions
against designated state sponsors of terrorism. In fact, these reforms are in part a legislative fix
to certain adverse precedent from the D.C. Circuit because Ҥ 1605A(c) abrogates Cicippio-
Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2004), by creating a federal right of
action against foreign states, for which punitive damages may be awarded.” Simon, 529 F.3d at
1190. Thus, to fully grasp the significance these latest reforms, it is important to have some
understanding regarding the manner in which the state sponsor of terrorism exception was
shaped over time through the jurisprudence of this Circuit. More fundamentally, however, this
historical backdrop is essential to the Court’s analysis of the Article III separation-of-powers
issue below in Part E, as well as for the Court’s conclusion in Part K that even greater reforms in
the law are necessary.
Accordingly, the Court will now briefly provide a historical overview of the state sponsor
of terrorism exception, as it was originally constituted under § 1605(a)(7) (repealed), and the socalled
Flatow Amendment to that exception, . This part of the discussion will examine some of
the early litigation against Iran before this Court in cases arising out of Iran’s provision of
material support and resources to terrorist organizations, such as Hamas and Hezbollah. The
important historical background that follows breaks down roughly into three parts. The Court
will begin with a discussion of Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998)
[hereinafter Flatow I] (Lamberth, J.), which was the first case in the country to be decided

against Iran under the state sponsor of terrorism exception. After discussing this Court’s ruling
in Flatow, this Court will then review the decision of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in
Cicippio-Puleo, 353 F.3d 1024, in which the Court found that neither § 1605(a)(7) nor the
Flatow Amendment furnish a cause of action against a foreign state. This Court examines the
negative consequences and practical implications of that ruling for plaintiffs in these terrorism
cases. After examining the fallout from Cicippio-Puleo, this Court proceeds to address what has
been the greatest problem for these plaintiffs, and that is the fact that there are simply not
sufficient Iranian assets that are amenable to attachment or execution in satisfaction of judgments
entered against Iran under the FSIA terrorism exception.4
1. The Original State Sponsor of Terrorism Exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunity,
Section 1605(a)(7) and the Flatow Amendment, Section 1605 Note, and Litigation
Against Iran for its Provision of Material Support to Terrorist Organizations
The state sponsor of terrorism exception to foreign sovereign immunity applies only to
foreign sovereigns officially designated as state sponsors of terrorism by the State Department.
See § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); § 1605(a)(7)(a) (repealed). This exception to foreign sovereign
immunity is commonly known as the “terrorism exception.” See, e.g., Kilburn v. Socialist
4 For an excellent summary of the litigation and evolution of the law pertaining to the
state sponsor of terrorism exception of the FSIA, see JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERV., SUITS AGAINST TERRORIST STATES BY VICTIMS OF TERRORISM (2008)
[hereinafter SUITS AGAINST TERRORIST STATES], available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL31258.pdf. This Congressional Research Service report on
terrorism lawsuits is the logical starting point for anyone who is hoping to gain a solid grasp of
the development of this area of the law and its many complexities. In addition to chronicling
important legislative developments, the report captures and summarizes the civil litigation that
has occurred in this Court against Iran under the state sponsor of terrorism exception to the
FSIA. This Court is grateful to the Congressional Research Service, and to Ms. Elsea in
particular, for their thorough work on this unique and important topic. This Court has examined
and relied on many of the original source materials identified in the report for additional insight
on these matters beyond the Court’s own experience in presiding over dozens of civil actions
against Iran.

People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 376 F.3d 1123, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Under the exception,
foreign sovereign immunity is eliminated in two different categories of terrorism cases: (1) those
in which the designated foreign state is alleged to have committed certain acts of terrorism, i.e.,
torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, or hostage taking; and (2) those in which the
designated state is alleged to have provided “material support or resources” for such terrorist
acts. See § 1605A(a)(1); § 1605(a)(7) (repealed). Thus, a designated state sponsor of terrorism
might be held to account for its specific acts of terrorism, as well as, more broadly speaking, its
“provision of material support or resources” in furtherance of acts of terrorism. See
§ 1605A(a)(1); § 1605(a)(7) (repealed).
The statute is intended to protect American victims of state-sponsored terrorism, and
therefore only United States citizens and nationals may rely on its grant of subject matter
jurisdiction. See § 1605A(a)(1); § 1605(a)(7) (repealed); see also Acosta v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 574 F. Supp. 2d. 15, 25–26 (D.D.C. 2008) (Lamberth, C.J.) (denying claims of victim,
Rabbi Meir Kahane, who had voluntarily renounced his U.S. citizenship years prior to his
assassination by Islamic terrorists). Thus, the victim or claimant in an action against a state
sponsor of terrorism must have been a United States citizen or national at the time of the incident
that gave rise to his claim(s). See Acosta, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 26.
Most of the actions in this Court against Iran have proceeded under that portion of the
terrorism exception relating to “the provision of material support or resources” for terrorist acts.
See, e.g., Flatow I, 999 F. Supp. 1; Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 2000) (Lamberth, J.); Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 466 F. Supp. 2d 229 (D.D.C.
2006) (Lamberth, J.). The terrorism exception adopts the definition of “material support or
resources” set forth in the criminal code at 18 U.S.C § 2339A(b)(1):

[T]he term “material support or resources” means any property, tangible
or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial
securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance,
safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment,
facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals
who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious
materials[.]
See § 1605A(h)(3) (incorporating § 2339A(b)(1) by reference); see also § 1605(a)(7) (repealed).
This Court has determined that “the routine provision of financial assistance to a terrorist
group in support of its terrorist activities constitutes ‘providing material support and resources’
for a terrorist act within the meaning of the [terrorism exception of the FSIA].” Flatow I, 999 F.
Supp. 1 at 19. Additionally, this Court has found that “a plaintiff need not establish that the
material support or resources provided by a foreign state for a terrorist act contributed directly to
the act from which his claim arises in order to satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)’s statutory
requirements for subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. In other words, there is no “but-for” causation
requirement with respect to cases that rely on the material support component of the terrorism
exception to foreign sovereign immunity; “[s]ponsorship of a terrorist group which causes
personal injury or death of United States national alone is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction.” Id.;
see also Kilburn, 376 F.3d at 1129 (holding that Liyba’s actions need not be the “but for”
causation of an act of terrorism for the purpose of establishing subject matter jurisdiction under
the terrorism exception). Once the requirements for jurisdiction over a foreign state are satisfied
under the FSIA, then that foreign state can be held liable in a civil action “in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” § 1606.
When the FSIA state sponsor of terrorism exception was first enacted in April of 1996, it
was far from clear whether that statute, § 1605(a)(7), in and of itself, served as a basis for an
independent federal cause of action against foreign state sponsors of terrorism. While the waiver

of foreign sovereign immunity was clear, and hence the provision authorized courts to serve as a
forum to adjudicate certain terrorism cases, questions remained regarding whether any civil
claims or money damages were available by virtue of that enactment. To clarify matters,
Congress created what is commonly referred to as the Flatow Amendment, which was enacted a
mere five months after the state sponsor of terrorism exception as part of the Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997. See Pub. L. 104-208, § 589, 110 (1996), 110 Stat. 3009-
1, 3009-172 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note). The Flatow Amendment provides in pertinent
part that:
An official, employee, or agent of a foreign state designated as a state
sponsor of terrorism . . . while acting within the scope of his office, employment,
or agency shall be liable to a United States national or the national’s legal
representative for personal injury or death caused by acts of that official,
employee, or agent for which courts of the United States may maintain
jurisdiction under section 1605(a)(7) of title 28, United States Code [repealed] for
money damages which may include economic damages, solatium, pain, and
suffering, and punitive damages if the acts were among those described in section
1605(a)(7).
§ 1605 note.
The amendment is named for Alisa Michelle Flatow, a 20-year-old Brandeis University
student from New Jersey who was mortally wounded in a suicide bombing attack on the Gaza
strip in April of 1995. Alisa Flatow’s father, Stephen Flatow, was one of the prime movers
behind the state sponsor of terrorism exception, and he successfully lobbied to have the
amendment incorporated as part of § 1605. See, e.g., Neely Tucker, Pain and Suffering;
Relatives of Terrorist Victims Race Each Other to Court, but Justice and Money are Both Hard
to Find, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2003, at F1 [hereinafter Tucker, Pain and Suffering] (recalling
Stephen Flatow’s lobbying efforts on behalf of the anti-terrorism legislation); see also Ruthanne
M. Deutsch, Suing State-Sponsors of Terrorism Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act:

Giving Life to the Jurisdictional Grant After Cicippio-Puleo, 38 INT’L LAW. 891 (2004)
(discussing legislative history of the Flatow Amendment and collecting sources); SUITS AGAINST
TERRORIST STATES, supra note 4, at 5–7 (discussing legislative history of § 1605(a)(7) and
Flatow Amendment).
Stephen Flatow filed suit in this Court shortly after the enactment of the Flatow
Amendment. As administrator of Alisa Flatow’s estate, plaintiff asserted a wrongful death claim
and a claim for Alisa’s conscious pain and suffering prior to her death. See Flatow I, 999 F.
Supp. at 27–29. Plaintiff also asserted solatium claims for the mental anguish and grief suffered
by the decedent’s parents and siblings as a result of her murder by terrorists. See id. at 29–32.
Plaintiff also sought punitive damages. See id. at 32–35. Iran did not enter an appearance in the
action and has never appeared in any FSIA terrorism action to date. See id. at 6.5
The Flatow case was the first in the country to be decided against Iran under the terrorism
exception to the FSIA. See 999 F. Supp. at 6 n.2. In that decision, this Court examined the
statutory language of the terrorism exception, § 1605(a)(7), and the Flatow Amendment, § 1605
5 Iran has never appeared in these actions even though it is “an experienced litigant in the
United States Federal Court System generally and in this Circuit. See, e.g., Cicippio v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1078 (1995); Foremost-
McKesson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Presinger v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Berkovitz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 735 F.2d
329 (9th Cir. 1984); McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1983).” Flatow
I, 999 F. Supp. 1 at 6 n.1. Nevertheless, this Court cannot enter a default judgment against a
foreign sovereign unless the plaintiff “establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence
satisfactory to the Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). Thus, this Court must carefully review the
plaintiff’s evidence with respect to both liability and damages.
While Iran has not defended itself in any of the lawsuits under the terrorism exception,
Iran has on occasion come to court to prevent plaintiffs from collecting on default judgments
entered under that provision. For example, Iran recently prevailed in an action to prevent the
attachment of one of its assets here in the United States. See, e.g., Ministry of Defense and
Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elahi, 129 S. Ct. 1732 (2009).

note, in pari materia and found that those provisions collectively established both subject matter
jurisdiction and federal causes of actions for civil lawsuits against state sponsors of terrorism.
See id. at 12–13. This Court also ruled that the Flatow Amendment was intended to ensure large
punitive damage awards against state sponsors of terrorism. See id. In this Court’s view, the
express provision of punitive damages in the Flatow Amendment, in conjunction with the
provisions’s legislative history, including statements by the Amendment’s co-sponsors,
Representative Jim Saxton and Senator Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey, demonstrated that
Congress believed punitive damage awards were absolutely necessary to ensure that civil actions
against state sponsors of terrorism would effectively deter those nations from perpetuating
international terrorism. See id. Thus, the Flatow Amendment served as an exception to the
general rule, as expressed in § 1606 of the FSIA, that foreign sovereigns are not to be held liable
for punitive damages.
During a two-day hearing in March of 1998, plaintiff proceeded in the manner of a nonjury
trial. Id. at 6. The evidence presented to the Court at that time demonstrated by clear and
convincing evidence that Iran was the sole source of funding for the Shaqaqi faction of Palestine
Islamic Jihad, a small terrorist cell that claimed responsibility for and in fact perpetuated the
suicide bombing that gravely wounded Alisa Flatow on April 9, 1995. Id. at 8–9. The suicide
bomber rammed a van full of explosives into the number 36 Egged bus that Alisa and others
were traveling in on their way to a Mediterranean resort in the Gush Katif community in Gaza.
Id. at 7. The resulting explosion destroyed the bus and sent shrapnel flying in all directions. Id.
A piece of that shrapnel pierced Alisa’s Flatow’s skull and lodged in her brain. Id. Once
Stephen Flatow learned that his daughter had been injured in the attack, he immediately flew to
Israel, and he rushed to the Soroka Medial Center, where Alisa was being treated. Upon his

arrival there, however, the attending physician informed Mr. Flatow that his daughter Alisa
“showed no signs of brain activity, that all physical functions relied on life support, and that
there was no hope for her recovery.” Id. at 8. In emotionally powerful testimony before this
Court, Stephen Flatow described the heart-wrenching decision he made to have his daughter’s
life support terminated and her organs harvested for transplant. See id.
This Court ultimately awarded a total of 22.5 million dollars in compensatory damages.
More significantly, however, the Court also awarded 225 million dollars in punitive damages,
approximately three times Iran’s annual expenditures on terrorist activities at that time. See id. at
34. In providing for such a large award of punitive damages against Iran, this Court stressed the
importance of such awards as a means to deter states like Iran from supporting terrorist
organizations. The Court stated as follows:
By creating these rights of action, Congress intended that the Courts impose a
substantial financial cost on states which sponsor terrorist groups whose
activities kill American citizens. This Cost functions both as a direct deterrent,
and also as a disabling mechanism: if several large punitive damage awards
issue against a foreign state sponsor of terrorism, the state’s financial capacity
to provide funding will be curtailed.
Id. at 33 (emphasis added). The Court also recognized that any punitive damage award would
have to be substantial enough to have an appreciable impact in light of Iran’s significant annual
revenues from oil exports. See id. at 33–34.
At the time the Flatow decision was announced, there was a certain degree of energy and
optimism surrounding the action. Senator Frank Lautenberg held a press conference outside this
courthouse with Alisa Flatow’s parents and their attorneys. They underscored the importance of
the Court’s decision as a measure of justice for victims of terrorism, and they stressed the
importance of holding state sponsors of terrorism accountable for their support of terrorist

groups. See Bill Miller & Barton Gellman, Judge Tells Iran to Pay Terrorism Damages; $247
Million Award for Family of U.S. Victim in Gaza, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1998, at A1. Steven
Perles, one of the attorneys for the Flatows, spoke of Iran’s wealth and expressed his belief that
the Flatows would “collect the entirety of the judgment.” See id. At the time, the popular
sentiment was that terrorism victims were going to “sue the terrorists out of business.” See
Tucker, Pain and Suffering, supra. In the years immediately following the Flatow decision,
many more plaintiffs relied on the original terrorism exception, § 1605(a)(7), in combination
with the Flatow Amendment, to successfully litigate cases against Iran. See, e.g., Stern v.
Islamic republic of Iran, 271 F. Supp. 2d 286 (D.D.C. 2003) (Lamberth, J.); Hutira v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 211 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D.D.C. 2002) (Lamberth, J.); Eisenfeld, 172 F. Supp. 2d
1.6 Large judgments against the state sponsor of terrorism amassed quickly. Unfortunately, in
most cases, the victories obtained by plaintiffs in this courthouse merely signaled the beginning
of what would become a long, bitter, and often futile quest for justice.
6 Although this Judge ruled in Flatow that the Flatow Amendment,1605 note, did furnish
a cause of action against a state sponsor of terrorism, this Judge elected to revisit the issue even
more throughly in Cronin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, a case concerning an American Professor
who was taken hostage and tortured by Hizbollah in Beirut, Lebanon in 1984. See 238 F. Supp.
2d 222 (D. D.C. 2002) (Lamberth, J.). The Court did so in part because the Court of Appeals
had flagged the issue in Price by observing that “‘the amendment does not list ‘foreign states’
among the parties against whom an action may be brought.’” Cornin, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 231
(quoting Price, 294 F.3d at 87). As this Court revisited what was then a crucial question, this
Court observed that a majority of the judges of this Court by that time had ruled that the Flatow
Amendment did provide for a cause of action against a foreign state in cases in which that state is
not entitled to immunity by virtue of the terrorism exception, § 1605(a)(7). See id. at 233
(collecting cases). Nonetheless, § 1605 note is not a model of clarity, and as Judge Sullivan
pointed out in Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, there are a number of valid reasons why
§ 1605 note should not be construed as furnishing substantive claims against foreign states. See
195 F. Supp. 2d 140, 171–175 (holding that Flatow Amendment did not furnish a cause of
action).

2. Setbacks for Plaintiffs: The D.C. Circuit’s Decision in Cicippio-Puleo
Nearly six years following the Flatow decision, and contrary to what this Court and
others had determined, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that “[p]lainly neither section
§ 1605(a)(7) nor the Flatow Amendment, separately or together, establishes a cause of action
against foreign state sponsors of terrorism.” Cicippio-Puleo, 353 F.3d at 1027. According to the
Court of Appeals, the original terrorism exception to the FSIA, § 1605(a)(7), was “merely a
jurisdiction conferring provision,” and therefore it did not create an independent federal cause of
action against a foreign state or its agents. Id. at 1032. In other words, the prior version of the
terrorism exception, § 1605(a)(7), merely waived foreign sovereign immunity for designated
terrorist states with respect to actions taken by those states in furtherance of international
terrorism, but it did not furnish a legal claim for money damages that a terrorism victim might
then assert in a lawsuit against Iran or any other designated state sponsor of terrorism. Instead,
plaintiffs in terrorism cases were required to find a cause of action based on some other source of
law. Id. at 1037.
With respect to the Flatow Amendment, § 1605 note, the Court held that the provision
“provides a private right of action only against individual officials, employees, and agents of a
foreign state, but not against the foreign state itself.” Id. at 1027. Thus, the cause of action
furnished by the Flatow Amendment is severely restricted because it applies only to claims
against foreign state officials, employees, and agents, “in their individual capacities, as opposed
to their official capacities.” Id. at 1034 (emphasis in original). In reaching its holding, the Court
of Appeals emphasized that a claim against a foreign state official for actions taken within his
official capacity on behalf of a foreign government “‘is in substance a claim against the
government itself’” Id. (citations omitted). As the Court found that neither the plain language

nor the legislative history of the Flatow Amendment suggested that Congress intended to impose
liability on foreign governments, plaintiffs were precluded from relying on that provision for
either claims against Iran or claims based on acts taken by Iranian officials within the scope of
their official duties. Id. at 1034–1036. After rendering its ruling the Cicippio-Puleo, the Court
of Appeals remanded the action back to this Court in order to enable plaintiffs in that case to
amend their complaint to state a cause of action against Iran “under some other source of law,
including state law.” Id. at 1036.
As a result of the Cicippio-Puleo decision, plaintiffs in FSIA terrorism cases under
§ 1605(a)(7) began to use that provision as a “‘pass-through’” to causes of actions found in state
tort law. Bodoff v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 424 F. Supp. 2d 74, 83 (D.D.C. 2006) (Lamberth,
J.); see also Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d 1, 12 (2d Cir. 1996) (describing
how FSIA acts as pass-through to state law by virtue of § 1606) (quoting Zicherman v. Korean
Airlines Co, 516 U.S. 217, 229 (1996)). By using the pass-through approach under the earlier
version of the terrorism exception, § 1605(a)(7), most terrorism victims who pursued FSIA cases
against Iran were in fact able to litigate claims based on the tort law of the state jurisdiction
where they were domiciled at the time of the terrorist incident giving rise to the lawsuit.
In the large consolidated case of Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, for example, this
Court found that Iran furnished money, weapons, training, and guidance to Hezbollah in direct
support of a terrorist plot that culminated in large-scale suicide bombing attack on the United
States Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon on October 23, 1983. See 264 F. Supp. 2d at 47–59
(D.D.C. 2003) [hereinafter Peterson I] (Lamberth, J.).7 More than 200 American servicemen
7 Peterson is consolidated with Boulos v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 01-CV-2684-RCL
(D.D.C.).

lost their lives and countless others were injured in the bombing. Prior to September 11, 2001,
the attack on the Marines in Beirut was the most deadly terrorist attack ever carried out against
American citizens. By examining the claims in that case under a number of sources of state law,
this Court awarded to the family members of the deceased servicemen and the injured survivors
of the Beirut attack exceeds 2.6 billion dollars and remains one of the largest judgments ever
awarded in a FSIA action pursuant to the state sponsor of terrorism exception. See Peterson v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 515 F. Supp. 2d 25, 44–45 (D.D.C. 2007) [hereinafter Peterson II]
(Lamberth, J.). Like Peterson, the majority cases addressed in today’s opinion stem from the
1983 bombing of the Marine barracks facility in Beirut, Lebanon.
In another action considered today, Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, plaintiffs
demonstrated how Iran’s financial support of Hamas helped to perpetrate terrorist attacks,
including a 2002 suicide bombing incident at Hebrew University in Jerusalem that claimed the
life of their 24-year-old daughter. See 507 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D.D.C. 2007) (Lamberth, J.). In
Bennett, the plaintiffs relied on California law. Similarly, in Beer v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
family members of an American killed in a suicide bombing of a bus in Jerusalem showed how
Iran’s material support to Hamas in the form of funding, safe haven, training, and weapons,
helped to spur on violent suicide attacks in Israel and elsewhere. 574 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.
2008) (Lamberth, J.).8 The plaintiffs in Beer relied on New York common law.
8 This Court has also decided FSIA cases arising from Iran-sponsored terrorist attacks
that have occurred here in the United States. Acosta, for example, arose out of the assassination
of Rabbi Meir Kahane, an Israeli political figure and a founder of the Jewish Defense League,
who was gunned down by Islamic Jihadists as he was concluding a lecture in New York City on
November 5, 1990. See 574 F. Supp. 2d 15.

But while larger majority of plaintiffs in actions post-Cicippio-Puelo were able to use the
pass-through approach to find relief, hundreds of others equally dissevering plaintiffs had their
claims denied because they were domiciled in jurisdictions that did not afford them a substantive
claim. In the Peterson case, for example, some family members of the Marines and other
servicemen who were killed in the 1983 terrorist bombing were barred from asserting intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims (IIED) because they lacked standing under the applicable
state tort law. Consequently, this Court had to dismiss the IIED claims of family members who
were domiciled in either Pennsylvania or Louisiana at the time of the terrorist attack because
those jurisdictions would not permit IIED claims by family members who were not physically
present at the site of the incident that gave rise to the emotional distress. See Peterson II, 515 F.
Supp. 2d at 44–45. Thus, the Pennsylvania and Louisiana plaintiffs in the Peterson action were
effectively denied their day in court, and yet they watched as many other similarly situated
plaintiffs (including some of their own family members) from different state jurisdictions
advanced and ultimately prevailed with their claims for IIED. For those Pennsylvania and
Louisiana plaintiffs who were denied relief as so many others succeeded based on precisely the
same kinds of claims, based on the same horrific and unquestionably traumatic incident, the
result must have seemed both arbitrary and unfair.
In addition to the unfairness caused by a lack of uniformity in the underlying state
sources of law, the pass-through approach proved cumbersome and tedious in practical
application. In a given case based on a single terrorist incident, this Court would usually have to
resolve choice of law problems and then proceed through a lengthy analysis of tort claims under
the laws of numerous different state jurisdictions. For example, in the Heiser case, a large
consolidated action involving the Khobar towers bombing, this Court issued a 209-page opinion

in which it ultimately applied the laws of 11 different state jurisdictions. See 466 F. Supp. 2d
299. In Peterson, this Court had to apply the laws of nearly 40 different jurisdictions in order to
resolve the victims’ claims. See Peterson II, 515 F. Supp. 2d 25. To efficiently manage these
terrorism cases under the pass-through regime imposed by Cicippio-Puleo, this Court would
frequently refer the action to special masters after the Court determined under § 1605(a)(7) that
Iran provided material support for a terrorist incident that killed or injured Americans.9
Another consequence of the Cicippio-Puleo decision was that the Flatow Amendment
could not serve as independent basis for punitive damages awards against Iran. As the Court of
Appeals found that the amendment was not intended to provide for claims against foreign states,
the bar on punitive damages in § 1606 of the FSIA remained in tact, even with respect to state
sponsors of terrorism. Accordingly, large awards of punitive damages, like that which this Court
granted in Flatow to deter Iran from sponsorship of terrorist groups, were no longer available in
actions against the state of Iran under § 1605(a)(7).10
9 The application of diverse sources of substantive law to claims in accordance with the
pass-through approach under § 1605(a)(7) may sometimes requires courts to look to foreign
sources of law. See Oveissi, 573 F.3d 835. In Oveissi, the Court of Appeals ruled that this Court
must apply French law to resolve emotional distress and wrongful death claims brought by an
American grandson of General Gholam Oveissi, who was the head of the Iranian armed forces
under the Shah’s regime. General Oveissi was assassinated in France by Hezbollah operatives in
February of 1984.
10 In all of the civil actions against the Islamic Republic of Iran considered here today,
Iran’s Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS) is also named as a defendant. One of the
actions also includes the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a defendant. See
Rimkus v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 06-CV-1116-RCL (D.D.C.).
As noted, § 1606 of the FSIA provides that foreign states may not be held liable for
punitive damages, and, as a result of Cicippio-Puleo, that exemption from punitive damages
applies to state sponsors of terrorism in actions under § 1605(a)(7), notwithstanding the Flatow
Amendment. Section 1606 also provides, however, that an “agency or instrumentality” of a
foreign state, as opposed to the state itself, may be liable for punitive damages. Thus, certain

3. The Never-Ending Struggle to Enforce Judgments Against Iran
In the years since the Flatow decision, a number of practical, legal, and political obstacles
have made it all but impossible for plaintiffs in these FSIA terrorism cases to enforce their
default judgments against Iran. This Court has examined this fundamental and longstanding
problem time and again as plaintiffs before this Court have sought, with very little success, to
entities of a foreign government may be liable for punitive damages. In terrorism cases against
Iran in this Court under § 1605(a)(7), plaintiffs have never identified an appropriate Iranian
agency that would qualify as an “agency or instrumentality” of Iran for the purpose of a punitive
damages award.
In Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, a case that was decided only a few months prior to
Cicippio-Puleo, the Court of Appeals emphasized that it follows a categorical approach when
determining whether a foreign governmental entity should be considered “‘a foreign state or
political subdivision’ rather than an ‘agency or instrumentality of the nation’” for purposes of the
FSIA. 333 F.3d 228, 234 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Transaero, Inc. V. La Fuerza Aerea
Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148, 149–50 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). Under the categorical approach, “if the core
functions of the entity are governmental, it is considered the foreign state itself; if commercial,
the entity is an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state.” Id. In Roeder, the Court
determined that Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is part of the foreign state itself, rather than an
“agency of instrumentality” because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, like a nation’s armed
forces, is governmental in nature. Id. Following the Roeder decision, this Court found that
MOIS must be considered part of the state of Iran itself and is therefore exempt from liability for
punitive damages. See, e.g., Haim v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 425 F. Supp. 2d 56, 71 n.2
(D.D.C. 2006) (Lamberth, J.).
In Rimkus, a case that is addressed in today’s consolidated opinion, the plaintiffs asserted
claims against IRGC as well as MOIS. In rendering the decision in Rimkus, this Court again
followed the categorical approach from Roeder and determined that IRGC, like MOIS, is part of
the state itself and is therefore exempt from punitive damage under the FSIA. See 575 F. Supp.
2d 181, 198–200 (D.D.C. 2008) (Lamberth, C.J.); see also Blais v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 459
F. Supp. 2d 40, 60–61 (D.D.C. 2006) (Lamberth, J.) (concluding that both MOIS and IRGC must
be treated as the state of Iran itself for purposes of liability); Salazar v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
370 F. Supp. 2d 105, 115–16 (D.D.C. 2005) (Bates, J.) (same). Consequently, in the years
following Cicippio-Puleo, plaintiffs in actions under the original terrorism exception,
§ 1605(a)(7), lacked a basis for claiming punitive damages in actions arising out of Iransponsored
terrorism.
Because claims against MOIS or IRGC are not legally distinguishable from claims
against Iran itself, this opinion refers to Iran as the only defendant.
Case 1:01-cv-02094-RCL Document 439 Filed 09/30/2009 Page 27 of 191
- 28 -
locate and attach Iranian Government assets in aid of execution of their civil judgments. See,
e.g., Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 604 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2009) (Lamberth, C.J.);
Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 563 F. Supp. 2d 268 (D.D.C. 2008) [hereinafter Peterson
III] (Lamberth, C.J.); Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 274 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2003)
(Lamberth, J.); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999) [hereinafter
Flatow III] (Lamberth, J.); Flatow v. Isl